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Objectives’ alignment between members and agricultural cooperatives  
 
Abstract 
Members’ commitment lessens when agricultural cooperatives grow larger. Their 
organization becomes more complex and their membership more heterogeneous, 
which threatens their sustainability and leads them to implement specific mechanisms 
for collective decisions. We explore how the alignment of objectives between a multi-
purpose cooperative and its members influences member commitment. We estimate a 
multinomial probit model on a cross-section sample of 3,205 members from a large 
agricultural cooperative in France. We assess the determinants of member 
commitment through four factors: the offer of new agricultural practices, the 
availability of outlets and supplies to members, the farm distance to the cooperative 
headquarters and the farm governance. We show that the adoption of new agricultural 
practices has a small but significant effect. The availability of outlets and supplies has 
the strongest effect on the economic involvement of the farmers. Other determinants, 
such as farm governance or geographical distance to the cooperative headquarters, 
also reinforce member commitment. 
 
Keywords: agricultural cooperatives, member commitment, farm innovation, 
economic involvement 
 
JEL classification: Q13, C35 
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Alignement des objectifs entre les coopératives agricoles et leurs adhérents 
 
Résumé  
L'engagement des adhérents diminue lorsque la taille des coopératives agricoles 
augmente. En effet, à mesure que la taille des coopératives augmente, leur 
organisation devient plus complexe, leur sociétariat plus hétérogène, ce qui menace 
leur durabilité et les conduit à mettre en œuvre de nouveaux mécanismes de décisions 
collectives. Nous explorons comment l'alignement des objectifs entre une coopérative 
polyvalente et ses adhérents influence leur engagement. Nous estimons un modèle 
probit multinomial sur un échantillon transversal de 3 205 adhérents d'une grande 
coopérative agricole française. Nous évaluons les déterminants de l'engagement des 
adhérents à partir de quatre critères: l'offre de nouvelles pratiques agricoles, la 
disponibilité des débouchés pour l’adhérent au sein de la coopérative, la distance entre 
le siège social de l’exploitation et celui de la coopérative et la gouvernance de 
l’exploitation. Nous montrons que l'adoption de nouvelles pratiques agricoles a un 
effet faible mais significatif sur l’engagement. La disponibilité des débouchés est le 
facteur qui a le plus d’impact sur l’engagement des adhérents. D'autres déterminants, 
tels que la gouvernance de l’exploitation ou la distance au siège social de la 
coopérative renforcent également l'engagement des adhérents. 
 
Mots-clés : coopérative agricole, engagement coopératif, innovation agricole, 
implication économique 
 
Classification JEL : Q13, C35 
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Objectives’ alignment between members and agricultural cooperatives 
 
1. Introduction 
The role of agricultural cooperatives is often highlighted in a context of crisis as a 
way to better balance bargaining power in the agri-food chain. Farmers can either 
better negotiate prices and quantities in the market through producer organizations 
(horizontal concentration) or form marketing cooperatives to benefit from scale 
economies and to add value to their members’ raw product through innovation and 
product quality (vertical organization) (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001). To succeed and to 
meet these goals, agricultural cooperatives need to strengthen their relationships with 
their members. However, this can be challenging when they grow larger and become 
more complex organizations (Nilsson et al., 2009). Indeed, large agricultural 
cooperatives face a heterogeneous membership, which leads them to implement 
specific mechanisms for collective decisions that can substantially increase costs. 
They often use the “one member, one vote” principle as a voting scheme. However, 
because the median member preferences may not coincide with the mean member 
preferences, a majority voting scheme might lead to inefficient decisions because the 
cooperative strategy is not supported by the entire membership. This issue can be 
exacerbated when some members combine to influence decisions in favour of their 
own interest (Hansmann, 1988). As a consequence, investor-owned firms (IOFs) can 
prove to be a more efficient organizational structure when membership is 
heterogeneous (Hart and Moore, 1996) or when managerial vision bias is strong 
(Deng and Hendrikse, 2015). Bontems and Fulton (2009) reinforce this result by 
showing that the cooperative organizational form is only efficient when the members’ 
goals are aligned and there is no aversion to unequal income redistribution. The 
objectives’ alignment between members and the cooperative reduces informational 
costs whereas an IOF faces them when it extracts rents from its suppliers. The main 
issue for cooperatives is to be able to differentiate themselves from IOFs and value 
membership commitment as argued by Fulton (1999, p.418): “member commitment is 
critical because it is a measure of how well a co-op is able to differentiate itself from 
an investor-owned firm.” It is thus crucial to focus on member commitment and 
determine which factors reinforce it. We question how the alignment of the objectives 
of both members and the cooperative influence member commitment. We define here 
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goal alignment as the association of the farmer’s choices with the cooperative’s 
strategies. This alignment might influence how a member participates in the 
cooperative and increases his commitment.  
The aim of this study is to assess the determinants of member commitment. Because 
we choose to examine the links between members and their cooperative, we use 
unique datasets from a large multipurpose cooperative in France. This allows us to 
confront our results based on farmers’ choices to the results found in the studies that 
explore attitudinal determinants (Hakelius and Hansson, 2016; Barraud-Didier et al., 
2014; Hernandez-Espallardo et al., 2013; Österberg and Nilsson, 2009). Furthermore, 
we explore and discuss how innovation can be used as a specific instrument to align 
the objectives between the cooperative and its members. Innovation promotion can be 
a key strategy for agricultural cooperatives. In our case study, the cooperative has 
recently implemented a new leading strategy based on innovative environmentally 
friendly farm practices to meet members’ demand. As a consequence, the cooperative 
differentiates itself from its competitors in both the upstream and the downstream 
markets. The CEO and the board of directors expect not only to gain market shares 
through the development of a new brand but also to commit their membership. The 
spread of innovative practices would then represent the best illustration of a goal 
alignment between members and the cooperative. We find that the availability of 
outlets and supplies has the strongest effect on the economic involvement of the 
farmers. We also show that farm innovation has a small but significant effect. The 
adoption of new agricultural practices reinforces the choice of high economic 
involvement.  
In the following section, we present a literature review covering the key determinants 
of membership commitment and our hypotheses about goal alignment. Next, we 
describe our empirical model. In Section 4, we present our results, and we discuss 
them in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Determinants of member commitment 
2.1. Related literature  
Member commitment includes two dimensions (Barraud-Didier et al., 2014; 
Österberg and Nilsson, 2009; Trechter et al., 2002; Fulton, 1999). First, members can 
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be more or less economically involved, as they may not deliver all their products to 
the cooperative. We will refer to this dimension later on using the term “economic 
involvement”. Second, they may not always strongly participate in cooperative 
governance (annual meeting attendance, voting participation). Both dimensions may 
affect cooperative performance.  
As membership becomes more heterogeneous and as cooperatives depart from their 
founding project, member commitment decreases (Nilsson et al., 2009). This decline 
may then lead to a loss in competitiveness as agricultural cooperatives might lose 
market share. These market losses affect members’ satisfaction because input prices 
are no longer low enough or output prices are not high enough. Hernandez-Espallardo 
et al. (2013) found empirically that the price paid to farmers determined their 
satisfaction with the cooperative and their intention to continue their membership. 
Because members’ economic involvement affects the level of business sales each 
year, it is thus a critical issue for cooperatives and their members. High economic 
involvement increases the cooperative’s benefits and allows investment or higher 
returns to members.  
Hernandez-Espallardo et al. (2013) also showed that other determinants highlighted 
by the transaction cost theory (safeguarding, performance evaluation and adaptation) 
played an even more relevant role in explaining members’ satisfaction with their 
cooperative and their desire to continue as members. First, members value all 
safeguarding measures, such as a secure outlet for their raw products in the short and 
long run. Second, members value their ability to get the information necessary to keep 
control over the board of directors. Third, members value the cooperative’s services 
as it helps them to meet market requirements and better face societal evolution, for 
example, through the use of more environmentally friendly farm practices. The 
adoption of new agricultural practices may not only favour new practices in 
accordance with public regulation, but they may also improve farm efficiency and 
create value at the downstream level. Moreover, it can increase member loyalty and 
play an important role by renewing the cooperative ethos.  
Several studies have examined the determinants of member commitment within the 
cooperative, either on economic involvement or governance participation (Barraud-
Didier et al., 2014; Cechin et al., 2013; Österberg and Nilsson, 2009; Hansen et al., 
2002;). Barraud-Didier et al. (2014) showed that the two levels of commitment are not 
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necessarily linked. Previous studies have examined how attitudinal determinants 
influence membership and more specifically, they have emphasized the role of trust  
(Barraud-Didier et al., 2012; Nilsson et al., 2009; Österberg and Nilsson, 2009; 
Morrow et al., 2004; Hansen et al., 2002). Indeed, Roe et al. (2004) found that 
farmers who state that trust in the contractor is important in starting a contractual 
relationship prefer cooperative forms. Among other key determinants, some of them 
are related to the characteristics of the cooperative, such as its size and complexity 
(Nilsson et al., 2009). Other determinants are associated with the characteristics of 
farms or farmers. Farm size has a positive impact on both participation in governance 
and economic involvement (Gray and Kraenzle, 1998; Bhuyan, 2007; Klein et al., 
1997). Pozzobon and Zylbersztajn (2011) demonstrated that the distance between the 
farm and the cooperative headquarters negatively influences the level of participation 
in governance. Filippi (2014) showed that coupling geographical proximity and 
cooperative governance could enhance member commitment. Many studies have also 
paid attention to members’ age because of potential intergenerational conflicts. 
Incumbent members may fear that new members may take advantage by free riding 
the existing investment made by the cooperative, and thus, the cooperative may 
underinvest (Rey and Tirole, 2007). Österberg and Nilsson (2009) showed that a 
member’s age is not correlated to any cooperative commitment. However, they also 
showed that older members might disagree with the implementation of new business 
practices in the cooperative. For Klein et al. (1997), older farmers tend to be more 
economically involved than younger ones. Trechter et al. (2002) found that member 
commitment diminishes with the level of education, which Bhuyan (2007) confirmed. 
However, they also indicated that when a cooperative provides education or when 
members serve or have served on the board of directors or cooperative committee, the 
level of member commitment is positively affected.  
 
2.2. Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
We focus on the determinants of member commitment and more specifically on the 
relationships between the farmers and their cooperative. We measure member 
commitment using members’ economic involvement. Economic involvement is a ratio 
that compares the number of activities for which a member delivers an output to the 
cooperative with the number of activities for which the member could choose to 
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deliver among all the outputs he/she produces in his/her farm. The cooperative uses 
this measure to favour the members who deliver all their outputs regardless of their 
volume of sales channelled through the cooperative. It reinforces the equality 
principle among members.  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework of objective alignment between the cooperative 
and its members 
 
In Figure 1, we represent how farms’ objectives may coincide with the cooperative’s 
objectives. First, some characteristics of both farms and the cooperative are long-term 
characteristics such as the farm and the cooperative localization and farm governance. 
Members and the board of directors cannot easily adjust them; however, they may 
affect their relationships. Second, farmers take short-term decisions that may also 
influence their economic involvement. They choose the outputs they produce, and 
then they choose the processing firm. Finally, the cooperative may decide to provide 
some services, to which members can choose to subscribe. To examine the objectives’ 
alignment, we formulate four hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: Innovation strengthens economic involvement in the cooperative. 
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Innovation can play a specific role in aligning members’ objectives with those of the 
cooperative. We intend to check whether, according to the results found by Klein et 
al. (1997), more innovation involves a higher observable farmers’ commitment. The 
agricultural cooperative has invested in an R&D department to develop new 
agricultural practices. We expect a higher commitment for members who adopt these 
techniques. First, the adoption of new agricultural practices can allow members to 
develop closer relationships with their field representatives who guide them towards 
technical changes (Filippi and Frey, 2015). Thus, a member may feel more committed 
to the cooperative by subscribing to those services and may increase his/her economic 
participation. Second, the cooperative offers a “green” brand when its final products 
use raw agricultural material produced with, for example, low use of pesticides or 
antibiotics. By doing so, the cooperative vertically differentiates itself from its 
competitors in the downstream market and thus reduces price competition. The brand 
creates value-added that members can partially capture as they change their 
production system to more ecological practices. We assume that the subscription to 
those services leads to an increase in members’ economic involvement. Farmers who 
do not use those practices cannot sell their products under the cooperative’s green 
brand. 
Hypothesis 2: The less the cooperative offers outlets and/or supplies, the less involved 
are the members. 
The availability of outlets or supplies offered by the cooperative is another dimension 
of the alignment of objectives. The agricultural cooperative might choose to select its 
activities in each area, and thus, it might not provide all the outlets and supplies its 
members need. In the vicinity of the headquarters, the multipurpose cooperative offers 
a large choice of services. In the areas far from the headquarters, the cooperative 
might only keep the most profitable or the activities with the largest market shares. 
Therefore, members might be forced to diversify their suppliers or clients in those 
areas.  
Hypothesis 3: The more distant the member is from the cooperative headquarters, the 
less involved he/she is. 
Third, geographical distance can diminish membership participation (Pozzobon and 
Zylbersztajn, 2011). Agricultural cooperatives, along with other agri-food firms, are 
merging and becoming larger companies. Their territorial area is thus wider. Member 
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farms might then be located far away from the cooperative headquarters and might 
feel more distant from the decision-making.  
Hypothesis 4: Farms run by several associates have a lower economic involvement in 
their cooperative. 
Finally, farms face major structural changes. Not only are they growing larger, but 
most of them also have more than one manager because of the development of 
incorporated forms of legal organization. Each associate can thus develop his/her own 
competence and specialization on the farm. Fulton (1999) emphasized the role of 
ideology in sustaining membership commitment. However, the associates who own a 
farm might not all share the same preference for cooperative forms. Therefore, the 
farm associates may want to diversify their outlets in order to satisfy all of them. In 
addition, they might choose several clients and/or suppliers. For an agricultural 
cooperative, these changes in farm structure might lead to fewer committed members.  
 
3. Empirical model 
3.1. Data  
Our study is based on a sample of 3,205 members of a large French multipurpose 
cooperative located in Western France. A dataset involving more cooperatives could 
have been useful for the scope of the study but an abundance of information would 
have been lost in the confidentiality compromise among cooperatives because of 
competition issues. Consequently, we have used a database with highly detailed 
members’ information from one of the 5 largest agricultural cooperatives in France 
and among the 15 largest in the European Union. The cooperative is a multi-purpose 
cooperative whose sales were greater than 4 billion euros in 2013. The database 
provides information on various socioeconomic member attributes in 2013. The 
cooperative differentiates itself from other agricultural cooperatives by orienting its 
strategy towards farm innovation. Summary statistics are given in Table 1.  
Economic involvement is measured using the ratio of delivered outputs to possible 
outputs. Delivered outputs represent the number of different activities for which a 
member delivers an output to the cooperative. Possible outputs denote the number of 
different activities for which a member could deliver an output to the multipurpose 
cooperative. Existing outputs denote the number of all the activities for which the 
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member produces an output. Note that the number of existing activities is higher than 
the number of possible activities, which is higher than the number of activities that 
lead to delivered outputs. Economic involvement is based on the number of activities 
that each member undertakes with the cooperative, which means that this ratio does 
not capture any information on the farm’s size or on member’s sales generated with 
the cooperative. Furthermore, we examine only the active membership of the 
cooperative, which represents approximately 25% of all the farmers who are members 
of the co-op. The cooperative only collects extensive data on this group of members, 
which creates a selection bias. We test the effect of this bias on our results in Section 
4. The cooperative defines an active member as a member whose economic 
involvement is greater than 0.5. Active members represent approximately 60% of the 
total sales made by the members’ activities. In our sample, the members of the 
cooperative produce 2.48 outputs on average and deliver 1.84 outputs to the 
cooperative.  
  
Table 1: Summary statistics of the relationships between the cooperative and its 
members 
                      
  (N = 3205)   Mean Std dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max   
  Economic involvement 0.84 0.21 0.5 0.67 1 1 1   
  Innovation (units)   1.80 1.59 0 1 1 3 10   
  Training   0.01 0.12 0 0 0 0 1   
  Supply services 0.09 0.30 0 0 0 0 2   
  Existing outputs (units) 2.48 1.24 1 1 2 3 8   
 Total Sales (1,000 €) 315 350 0 123 217 383 5399  
 Territorial presence 0.94 0.15 0.2 1 1 1 1  
 Membership duration (years) 17.27 10.71 0 7 17 25 64  
 Distance (100 km) 0.90 0.56 0.11 0.47 0.79 1.28 2.64  
 County member density 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.09 0.15 0.27 0.71  
  Farm specialization               
    Mixed farming 0.59 0.49 0 0 1 1 1   
    Specialization in crops 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1   
    Specialization in animal  0.08 0.27 0 0 0 0 1   
    production                 
  Farm governance                 
    Sole owner 0.31 0.46 0 0 0 1 1   
    Associates   0.69 0.46 0 0 1 1 1   
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Innovation relates to the number of new agricultural practices that members 
implement on their farm. The multipurpose cooperative offers 16 innovative 
agricultural practices, of which members implement 1.80, on average. The Supply 
services variable refers to the number of premium supply contracts that a member has 
subscribed to during the year. These contracts offer higher outputs prices as they 
allow the cooperative to make logistics efficiency gains. The cooperative offers two 
types of supply service contracts but only 9% of members have subscribed to those 
supply services on average. Training refers to a one-day training session for fuel-
efficient agricultural machinery driving techniques. Only 1% of our sample attended 
this training session. 
We also take into account the sales each member generates with the cooperative 
(Total sales). These sales represent 315,440 euros, on average. Territorial presence 
denotes how well the cooperative is established in its territory. We measure it using 
the ratio of possible outputs to existing outputs. A ratio equal to one means that the 
cooperative offers all the activities the members need. As the ratio decreases, the 
cooperative develops few activities in its territory because it does not provide either 
enough outlets or enough input supplies to its members. On average, the ratio is 0.94, 
which means that the cooperative offers most of the outlet or input supply members 
need. However, for 10% of the cooperative members, one third of their outputs cannot 
be delivered to the cooperative. Note that some members can have an economic 
involvement equal to one even if the territorial presence variable is lower than one. 
The reason is that the cooperative does not provide all the outlets they need for the 
products they have on their farm. We also include membership duration. However, 
this measure suffers from some bias, as a farmer becomes a new member when their 
farm changes its legal status (for example, by becoming larger through land purchase, 
a new activity or the entry of a new associate). This means that shorter membership 
durations may not always characterize new members. Distance is the distance 
between the farmstead and the cooperative headquarters. Members are located 
approximately 90 kilometres from the cooperative headquarters. One quarter of the 
members have a farm that is located less than 47 kilometres from the headquarters. 
We measure the density of farmers in each county where the cooperative conducts 
business. The county member density variable is a proxy to capture the social 
interactions between member and non-member farmers. We use the agricultural 
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census of 2010 to construct it. It measures the ratio of the number of members over 
the number of censed farmers in 2010 by county. By doing so, we assume that the 
change in farm structures between 2010 and 2013 is not significant. In the county 
where the cooperative has the largest number of members, 71% of the farmers in the 
county are members of the cooperative. 
We use dummies to control for farm specialization using specialization in animal 
production, specialization in crops and mixed farming. In our sample, more than half 
of the farms are mixed farms (59%), and a third specializes in crops (33%). Only 8% 
of the farms are specialized in animal production. We also control for the farm 
governance to consider that several associates may run a farm. The variable Sole 
owner means that the farmer is sole owner of his/her farm (31% of members in our 
sample). The variable Associates refers to farms that are run by several associates who 
may be or may not be family members (69%). 
 
3.2. The empirical model 
We examine what determines a member’s choice about his/her economic involvement 
in the cooperative using a multinomial probit model (Greene, 2003). A member’s 
utility 𝑈𝑖𝑗 that is associated with alternative j when the member i has a choice among 
k alternatives is the sum of a deterministic component 𝑉𝑖𝑗 that depends on the 
regressors xi  (xi   X) and an unobserved random component 𝜀𝑖𝑗. 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
xi are case-specific regressors as 𝑉𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥𝑖
 𝛽𝑗 . X is the variable ensemble including our 
interest variables (i.e., innovation, and supply services) and control variable (e.g., 
distance, the number of existing outputs, the cooperative territorial presence, farm 
governance). The introduction of control variables captures a portion of the member 
population heterogeneity and reduces endogeneity issues. The use of the multinomial 
probit model allows us to ignore the assumption that the 𝜀𝑖𝑗 terms follow an 
independently and identically standard type-1 extreme value distribution. Here, we 
assume that 𝜀𝑖𝑗 follows a multivariate normal distribution.  
Farmers have three economic involvement alternatives. First, they can choose low 
economic involvement (alternative 1), which means that the ratio of delivered outputs 
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to the possible outputs is 0.5. Their second alternative is an intermediate level of 
economic involvement; the ratio of delivered outputs to the existing outputs is 
between 0.5 and 1, and, their last alternative (alternative 3) is high economic 
involvement where the ratio of delivered outputs to the existing outputs is equal to 1. 
We assume that farmers choose their economic involvement in order to maximize 
their utility 𝑈𝑖𝑗. 𝑈𝑖𝑗 is a function of profit and the utility derived from cooperative 
membership. As both dimensions are unobserved, we assume that farmers only 
maximize their utility on the three alternatives. In our sample, 608 farmers choose low 
economic involvement (alternative 1), 714 farmers choose an intermediate economic 
involvement (alternative 2), and the remaining farmers have high economic 
involvement (alternative 3). Note that we do not use a continuous variable for 
economic involvement as members tend to be at both extremes. 
We observe the outcome 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝑗 when the alternative j gives the highest utility among 
all the alternatives. It follows that 
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝑗) = Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑖𝑘) , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘      (1) 
where 0 ≤ Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝑗) ≤ 1 and ∑ Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝑗) = 1
3
𝑗=1  
The issue of economic involvement is analysed by likelihood maximization through a 
multinomial probit model. In a multinomial probit model, the probability of a member 
i choosing an economic participation j is given by   
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = ∫ 𝜙(𝑤)
𝑈𝑗−𝑈1
(𝜎𝑗
2+𝜎1
2−2𝜎1𝑗)
1
2
𝑤=−𝑥
×  Φ [
(𝑈𝑗−𝑈1)
[(𝜎𝑗
2+𝜎1
2−2𝜎1𝑗)(1−𝑟𝑗
2)]
1
2
−
𝑤𝑟𝑗
(1−𝑟𝑗
2)
1
2
] 𝑑𝑤   (2) 
where j stands for the level of economic involvement (low, intermediate, high). The 
base outcome is when members choose low economic involvement (j = 1). 𝑟𝑗 
represents the correlation between the 𝜀𝑖𝑗 differences function of 𝜎𝑘 and is a function 
of 𝜎𝑗 (where 𝜎𝑗 enter in the distribution of the 𝜀𝑖𝑗). Considering that there are three 
alternatives, we have cov (
𝜀1
𝜀2
𝜀3
) = (
𝜎1
2   
𝜎12 𝜎2
2  
𝜎13 𝜎23 𝜎3
2
). In our case, we can write, for 
example, 𝑟2 = (𝜎2
2 − 𝜎12 − 𝜎23 + 𝜎13)/[(𝜎1
2 + 𝜎2
2 − 2𝜎12)(𝜎2
2 + 𝜎3
2 − 2𝜎23)]
1/2 . In 
addition, 𝜙( ) and Φ( ) represent the normal density and distribution function. 
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We compute semi-elasticities for each regressor to assess the effects of a relative 
change in the kth regressor on the probability that alternative j is the outcome.  
 
4. Results  
Using four multinomial probit models, we determine which factors influence the 
economic involvement of members. In Model 1, we measure only the effect of our 
interest variables (Innovation, Training, and Supply services). Models 2, 3 and 4 
include additional control variables. In Model 2, we include farm fixed effects (Farm 
specialization, Farm governance) whereas in Model 3, we include fixed effects about 
the relationships between the cooperative and members (Total sales, Territorial 
presence, Membership duration, Distance, County member density). Model 4 
integrates all fixed effects. The semi-elasticities (Ejk) and marginal effects (Mjk) 
computed for Model 4 are given in Table 2. The estimated coefficients of the four 
models, with their significance levels, are given in Appendix 1 (Table 3). 
We run an ordered probit using the high alternative as the reference in order to 
examine its effects on the parameters. Second, we explore the double censorship 
structure of economic involvement using a tobit model. Economic involvement is in 
the interval [0.5, 1]. In our data, there exists a selection bias because the cooperative 
collects only data for active members, who get an economic involvement ratio greater 
than or equal to 0.5. We obtain the greatest economic involvement value, which is 
equal to one (that is to say that members use the cooperative for all their output sales 
or input purchases) by construction. Finally, we also explore for unobserved drivers 
and interactions effects of economic involvement by running a spatial autoregressive 
model (SAR) with an ordered probit structure (LeSage and Pace, 2009). Cooperative 
members may benefit from local interactions, which can enhance economic 
involvement in the cooperative. We examine whether the interactions do modify 
parameter estimations. We obtain similar results (significance and signs) in all the 
three models. The results are provided in Appendix 2 (Table 4). 
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Table 2: Average change in the probability of choosing a low, intermediate or 
high level of economic involvement (Model 4 - Multinomial Probit Estimation) 
              
  Economic involvement Low Intermediate High  
  Semi-elasticities       
  Innovation   -0.009** -0.003 0.013*** 
  Training   -0.021 -0.024 0.045 
  Supply services -0.185*** -0.012 0.197*** 
  Existing outputs  -0.008 0.116*** -0.108*** 
 Total Sales -0.202*** -0.097 0.299*** 
 Total Sales ² 0.061*** -0.060 -0.001 
  Territorial presence 0.068 0.593*** -0.660*** 
  Membership duration -0.004** 0.003 0.002 
  Membership duration ² 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
  Distance    0.048 0.100* -0.148*** 
  Distance ²   0.020 -0.105*** 0.085*** 
  County member density 0.057 -0.054 -0.002 
  Marginal effects 
     Farm specialization 
       Ref : Mixed farming    
    Specialization in crops -0.302*** -0.042** 0.345*** 
    Specialization in animal  -0.063** -0.065** 0.128*** 
    production   
     Farm governance   
       Ref : Sole owner Ref Ref Ref 
    Associates   0.049*** 0.024 -0.074** 
  *, **, *** significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%     
 
4.1. Innovation and member commitment 
Innovation is a leading strategy for the multipurpose cooperative. Consequently, when 
farmers choose to adopt new agricultural practices, their objectives are aligned with 
the cooperative ones (Hypothesis H1). We intend to check whether, according to the 
results found by Klein et al. (1997), more innovation involves a higher observable 
farmers’ commitment. We find that innovation plays a small but significant role in 
economic involvement. The adoption of new agricultural practices through the 
purchase of cooperative services increases the probability of choosing a high level of 
economic involvement (𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,3 = 0.013 ) and decreases the probability of 
choosing a low level of economic involvement (𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,1 = −0.01). The results 
from the subsamples give some complementary insights into innovation (Appendices 
3 and 4). We find that new agricultural practices contribute to increasing the level of 
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economic involvement for the farms that produce both crops and animal productions. 
Innovation might then be a vector of the alignment of goals between the farm and the 
cooperative through closer relationships with the field representatives because for the 
cooperative, these farms could diversify more easily their partnership. Innovation 
does not play any role for the farms with a low cooperative territorial presence. Those 
farmers only benefit from a reduced choice among all the available new practices as 
the cooperative has already made a selection of outlets and supplies in those areas.  
The training variable has no influence on the probability to choose one of the 
economic involvement alternatives. The supply services play a similar role as the 
innovation one. The subscription to a supply service linearly increases the probability 
to be in a higher economic involvement level (𝐸𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠,3 = 0.20). The 
subscription to a supply service decreases the probability to be in the lowest economic 
involvement level (𝐸𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠,1 = −0.19). Indeed, farm innovation services 
allow the cooperative to differentiate itself from its main competitors through 
“greener” production. Farmers anticipate higher prices coupled with cost reduction to 
increase the farm margins. The expected effect for supply services on farm margins is 
similar: supply service subscribers increase their expected utility and could have 
incentives to increase their economic involvement in order to benefit from the entire 
potential of these services. 
 
4.2. Other determinants of member commitment 
We explore how the alignment of objectives between the cooperative and its members 
influences member commitment. The multipurpose cooperative might not offer all the 
marketing outlets or all the inputs members need, which can lead to a lower economic 
involvement (Hypothesis H2). The variable Territorial presence captures this effect, 
and it appears to be the main determinant of the economic involvement in the 
cooperative. We find that when the cooperative increases the number of outlets and 
supplies available to its members (the variable Territorial presence increases from 0 
to 1), the probability of a member choosing a high economic involvement 
significantly decreases (𝐸𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒,3 = −0.66). This result might seem 
surprising and leads to the rejection of Hypothesis H2; however, we suggest a 
possible explanation. When the cooperative is not well established in an area, the 
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choice of being economically involved does not rely only on economic and rational 
criteria; cooperative ideology might then play an important role. In the core area of 
the multipurpose cooperative, a farmer may choose to become a member because the 
cooperative organization represents the dominant firm. However, these farmers might 
not share the cooperative ideology and values. In this situation, economic criteria 
might strongly influence their choice. Moreover, in the low cooperative territorial 
presence area, the cooperative may favour the most profitable outlets or the most 
efficient activities. Consequently, the cooperative is more appealing to those farmers.  
Second, geographical distance can diminish membership commitment (Hypothesis 
H3). Distance from the cooperative headquarters does not affect the probability of a 
member choosing a low level of economic involvement. The semi-elasticity of a 
change in distance on the probability that a member chooses low economic 
involvement 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,1 is not significant. However, it affects the intermediate and 
high levels. As the distance between the farm and the cooperative increases, the 
probability of a member choosing an intermediate level of economic involvement 
increases but at a decreasing rate (𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,2 = 0.10 and 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒²,2 = −0.11). 
Moreover, it is more likely that a member chooses a higher level of economic 
involvement when distance to the cooperative headquarters decreases (𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,3 =
−0.15 and 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒2,3 = 0.09).  
Third, farms face major structural changes (Hypothesis H4). There are many 
differences according to farm governance. Farms that involve several associates have 
a lower probability of choosing high economic involvement (𝑀𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠,3 =
−0.07), and a higher probability of choosing low economic 
involvement (𝑀𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠,1 = 0.05) , compared with the farms run by a sole owner. 
Each associate can thus develop his/her own competence and specialization on the 
farm. However, associates who own a farm might not all share the same preference 
for cooperative forms. Therefore, farm associates may want to diversify their outlets 
in order to satisfy all of them. In addition, they might choose several clients and/or 
suppliers. For an agricultural cooperative, these changes in farm structure might lead 
to fewer committed members. 
The effect of county member density on member commitment is not significant. It 
seems that membership duration has a small positive effect on economic involvement. 
Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°17-02 
19 
The probability of a member choosing a low level of economic involvement decreases 
with membership duration (𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,1 = −0.004). This effect is particularly 
important for the first years of membership as indicated by the measures of the 
squared variable. It could suggest that new members choose to test the cooperative 
quality at the first stage with only a few activities and choose to increase their 
involvement latter on. This result could also reflect the preference of younger farms 
for market diversification. However, as our measure is imperfect and the effects are 
not highly significant, we should be careful with it.   
In addition, several variables explore the effect of farm diversification on members’ 
economic involvement. Farms can be multi-output oriented. We show that there is no 
linear effect of the multi-output orientation of members’ farms on their economic 
involvement. The presence of multi-outputs increases the probability of a member 
choosing an intermediate level of economic involvement (𝐸𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔,2 = 0.12) and 
decreases the probability of a member choosing a high level of economic involvement 
(𝐸𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔,3 = −0.11). Members are less likely to choose high economic involvement 
as multi-output orientation enhances the opportunity to diversify the members’ 
marketing channels. However, farm specialization increases the probability of 
choosing a high level of economic commitment. The effect is greater when farms 
specialize in crop production.  
 
4.3. Sensitivity analysis 
Estimations with ordered probit, tobit and SAR ordered probit models give similar 
results as the ones provided by the multinomial probit model. All the variables display 
the same signs. The amplitudes of the effects are explained by the estimation 
procedure. The results with the SAR ordered probit model highlight that unobserved 
spatial heterogeneity plays a large role in the total variability of our sample. Its 
correction does not however modify the signs of our interest variables (Appendix 2, 
Table 4). 
We also test the robustness of our results on two subsamples: the mixed farming 
sample and the low territorial presence one. We choose the first subsample to release 
the bias that almost mechanically leads the specialized farms to be at the highest 
economic involvement alternative. We choose the second subsample to test for the 
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cooperative territorial presence. The selected sample faces a reduced choice in outlets 
and supplies. We define a low territorial presence when its value is lower than one. 
The descriptive statistics and the results of the multinomial probit estimations of the 
two subsamples are available in Appendices 3 and 4 (Tables 5 to 8). The results on the 
mixed farming sample are similar to the ones obtained on the whole sample. It seems 
that our fixed effects for specialized farms capture the tendency to be more 
economically involved. The results based on the farms located where the cooperative 
is not well established are weaker. We do not find any effect of farm innovation on 
this subsample. Supply services increase economic involvement but the effect is 
strongest for the intermediate level of economic involvement (although very close to 
the effects found for the high alternative). We do find a non-linear effect of distance 
on economic involvement but the effect is only significant on the intermediate 
alternative. The farms that are located far from the headquarters have a higher 
probability to choose this category. The results on the influence of farm governance 
are similar to the ones found on the whole sample: the sole-owner farms are more 
economically involved. The weaker results on this subsample are not surprising 
because we estimate the multinomial probit on only 13.8% of the initial population. It 
does not seem that the cooperative presence significantly influences the effects of the 
other variables. Overall, our robustness checks validate the results obtained by the 
multinomial probit on the whole sample.  
 
5. Discussion 
This empirical study provides new insightful results. First, we focus on the 
relationships between the cooperative and its members, using original datasets from a 
large multipurpose cooperative. It allows us to obtain information on members’ 
choices and to confront our results with those obtained through surveys. Second, the 
study provides promising results about how farm innovation can play a key role in 
aligning members’ goals with the ones of the cooperative. These results may not only 
be of benefit to cooperative managers but also to policymakers. Indeed, in a context of 
environmental pressure, policymakers should help cooperatives to develop 
environmental solutions. As cooperatives have incentives to promote innovation to 
their membership, the effectiveness of environmental subsidies may be enhanced. To 
date, there has been little research examining the role played by farm innovation. 
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Karantininis et al. (2010) showed that the organization of the agri-food industry (in 
terms of vertical integration and contractual arrangements) matters for innovation. 
Agricultural cooperatives are a specific coordination scheme and when they are 
involved in innovation, welfare can be improved. Giannakas and Fulton (2005) 
demonstrated that agricultural cooperatives increase the rate of innovation while 
reducing the price of agricultural inputs. Drivas and Giannakas (2008, 2010) also 
found a positive effect on innovation activity when cooperatives exist in the market. 
These two theoretical studies underline the role of cooperatives, compared to IOFs, in 
innovation in the market. Note, however, that market structure could be more diverse; 
for instance, Agbo et al. (2015) provide insightful results when members can also use 
direct selling. However, these authors did not examine how innovation affects 
membership commitment. Innovation can lead members to be more efficient and 
reduce their production cost. It can also provide higher quality in the market. Whereas 
Jardine et al. (2014) demonstrate that a marketing cooperative can provide higher 
quality, Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013) highlight that free riding is a crucial issue for 
quality provision. They find that free riding on quality is strong in agricultural 
cooperatives. However, the magnitude of this effect depends on how individual 
quality in raw product affects the aggregated quality of the final product. To our 
knowledge, few studies have examined the interaction between economic 
involvement and innovation. Klein et al. (1997) showed that farmers who believed 
that cooperatives offered more innovative services were more economically involved 
in those cooperatives. Here, we highlight the role of farm innovation in strengthening 
member commitment, yet we were only able to use cross-sectional data from 2013, as 
the new agricultural practices have only recently been implemented in the 
cooperative.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We examine the drivers of member commitment in a large multipurpose cooperative 
that faces heterogeneous membership to better understand the links between members 
and their cooperative. As the alignment of objectives is a key issue for cooperative 
efficiency, we examine four factors that may have an influence on member 
commitment. We find that a reduced choice of activities has a positive effect on 
member commitment. In addition, we show that the adoption of innovative 
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agricultural practices plays a small but significant role in the level of members’ 
economic commitment. It increases the probability of choosing a high level of 
economic involvement and decreases the probability of choosing a low level of 
economic involvement. Other determinants, such as farm governance, the distance to 
the cooperative headquarters, member sales with the cooperative, and the multi-output 
farm strategy, have an effect on the level of member commitment. Among these 
determinants, only the multi-output farm strategy and the distance to the cooperative 
headquarters do not have a linear effect on economic involvement. Distance does not 
influence the probability of members choosing a low level of economic involvement 
whereas it does affect the probability of choosing a high or an intermediate level of 
economic involvement.  
It would be interesting to examine in more depth how innovation can be a possible 
force for strengthening membership involvement. As innovation is a long-term 
strategy, it would be interesting to further investigate how farm innovation spreads 
among all the members and how it affects economic involvement over years using 
panel data. 
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Appendix 1. Estimation of the four multinomial probit models 
Table 3: Estimation of the four multinomial probit models 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
 Economic involvement Low 
(Ref) 
Med. High Low 
(Ref) 
Med. High Low 
(Ref) 
Med. High Low 
(Ref) 
Med. High  
 Innovation  0.114*** -0.008  0.033 0.131***  0.073** -0.008  0.021 0.076***  
    (0.026) (0.024)  (0.029) (0.027)  (0.029) (0.026)  (0.032) (0.029)  
 Training  0.086 -0.103  -0.087 0.211  0.022 -0.089  0.041 0.220  
    (0.343) (0.331)  (0.356) (0.349)  (0.351) (0.337)  (0.362) (0.354)  
 Supply services  1.084*** 0.641***  0.766*** 1.326***  0.885*** 0.731***  0.694*** 1.331***  
    (0.168) (0.165)  (0.176) (0.174)  (0.172) (0.168)  (0.179) (0.178)  
 Existing outputs      0.692*** -0.217**     0.640*** -0.282***  
       (0.054) (0.049)     (0.060) (0.054)  
 Total sales        1.459*** 0.636***  0.314 1.700***  
         (0.421) (0.240)  (0.444) (0.228)  
 Total sales2        -1.266*** -0.018  -0.562* -0.253***  
         (0.330) (0.125)  (0.327) (0.082)  
 Territorial presence        2.390*** 0.468*  2.834*** -2.209***  
         (0.431) (0.252)  (0.531) (0.303)  
 Membership duration        0.047*** 0.013  0.032** 0.023*  
         (0.015) (0.012)  (0.016) (0.013)  
 Membership duration2        -0.001*** -0.001  -0.001** -0.001**  
         (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
 Distance         1.386*** 1.023***  0.327 -0.630**  
         (0.380) (0.261)  (0.4089) (0.304)  
 Distance2        -1.345*** -0.212*  -0.633*** 0.168  
         (0.217) (0.114)  (0.222) (0.131)  
 Canton member density        -0.138 0.990***  -0.515 -0.238  
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         (0.391) (0.315)  (0.443) (0.363)  
 Farm specialization              
  Ref: Mixed farming              
  Specialization in crops     0.867*** 1.880***     1.011*** 2.243***  
       (0.161) (0.128)     (0.181) (0.141)  
  Specialization in      0.256 0.726***     -0.083 0.631***  
  animal production     (0.202) (0.152)     (0.212) (0.163)  
 Farm governance              
  Ref : Sole owner              
  Associates     -0.095 -0.238**     0.075 -0.247**  
       (0.112) (0.094)     (0.122) (0.107)  
 Const  -0.195*** 0.928***  -2.194*** 0.793***  -3.010*** -0.609*  -4.665*** 3.032***  
    (0.062) (0.054)  (0.178) (0.151)  (0.502) (0.319)  (0.649) (0.424)  
 Number of observations  3205   3205   3205   3205   
 Log likelihood  -2983.56   -2335.56   -2716.90   -2134.30   
 LR chi2  98.98***   1007.35***   376.95***   1120.71***   
 *, **, *** significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%            
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Appendix 2. Estimation of model 4 with ordered probit, tobit and ordered probit 
with spatial effects  
Table 4: Estimation of model 4 with ordered probit, tobit and ordered probit 
with spatial effects 
Economic involvement Ordered probit  Tobit  Ordered probit with 
spatial effects 
Innovation 0.047***  0.028***  0.023* 
  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.014) 
Training 0.087  0.053  0.063 
  (0.185)  (0.111)  (0.160) 
Supply services 0.559***  0.344***  0.395*** 
  (0.077)  (0.047)  (0.067) 
Existing outputs  -0.239***  -0.153***  -0.109*** 
  (0.028)  (0.018)  (0.025) 
Total Sales 1.078***  0.670***  0.610*** 
 (0.135)  (0.080)  (0.099) 
Total Sales2 -0.138**  -0.084***  -0.097** 
 (0.055)  (0.034)  (0.031) 
Territorial presence -1.683***  -1.052***  -0.938*** 
 (0.188)  (0.118)  (0.146) 
Membership duration 0.014*  0.009*  0.008 
 (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Membership duration2 -0.001***  -0.000***  -0.000* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Distance  -0.445***  -0.258***  -0.307** 
 (0.175)  (0.106)  (0.142) 
Distance2 0.127*  0.078*  0.077 
 (0.077)  (0.047)  (0.061) 
County member density -0.336  -0.206  -0.211 
 (0.210)  (0.127)  (0.161) 
Farm specialization      
 Ref:Mixed farming      
 Specialization in 
crops 
1.560***  0.951***  0.783*** 
  (0.081)  (0.055)  (0.063) 
 Specialization in  0.459***  0.289***  0.317*** 
 animal production (0.098)  (0.060)  (0.084) 
Farm governance      
 Ref: Sole owner      
 Associates -0.249***  -0.153***  -0.132* 
  (0.058)  (0.035)  (0.044) 
Const   2.276***   
    (0.265)   
 /Cut 1 -2.87***    -2.285*** 
  (0.252)    (0.264) 
 /Cut 2 -2.064***    -1.522*** 
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  (0.251)    (0.200) 
 Rho     0.207*** 
      (0.039) 
 Number of obs 3205  3205  3205 
 Log likelihood -2475.71  -1999.95   
 *, **, *** significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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Appendix 3. Mixed farming sample (1889 obs) 
Table 5: Summary statistics on the mixed farming sample (N=1889) 
                      
  (N = 1899)   Mean Std dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max   
  Economic involvement 0.77 0.21 0.5 0.5 0.75 1 1   
  Innovation (units)   2.14 1.76 0 1 2 3 10   
  Training   0.02 0.14 0 0 0 0 1   
  Supply services 0.14 0.37 0 0 0 0 2   
  Existing outputs (units) 3.20 0.98 2 2 3 4 8   
 Total Sales (1000 €) 351 365 0 137 246 437 5400  
  Farm governance                 
    Sole owner 0.22 0.42 0 0 0 0 1   
    Associates   0.78 0.42 0 1 1 1 1   
  Membership duration (years) 17.48 10.39 0 8 17 25 48   
 Territorial presence 0.92 0.17 0.2 1 1 1 1  
  Distance (100 km) 0.76 0.52 0.12 0.43 0.63 0.92 2.47   
  County member density 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.71   
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Table 6: Estimation of the multinomial probit model on mixed farming 
  Economic involvement (Ref: low) Med.  High 
  Innovation 0.028 0.050 
    (0.033) (0.031) 
  Training -0.065 0.053 
    (0.365) (0.362) 
  Supply services 0.698*** 1.203*** 
    (0.184) (0.183) 
  Existing outputs  0.609*** -0.000 
    (0.065) (0.061) 
   Total Sales 0.057 1.414*** 
    (0.452) (0.250) 
   Total Sales2 -0.373 -0.191** 
    (0.317) (0.092) 
   Territorial presence 2.257*** -2.451*** 
    (0.525) (0.322) 
   Membership duration 0.031* 0.022 
    (0.018) (0.017) 
   Membership duration2 -0.001** -0.001** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
   Distance  0.235 -0.480 
    (0.442) (0.344) 
   Distance2 -0.640*** 0.085 
    (0.245) (0.150) 
   County member density -0.789 0.174 
    (0.495) (0.432) 
  Farm governance (Ref: Sole owner)   
    Associates -0.046 -0.408*** 
     (0.136) (0.120) 
  Const -3.798*** 2.486*** 
    (0.659) (0.467) 
  Number of observations 1889  
  Log likelihood -1722.38  
  LR chi2 436.19  
  *, **, *** significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%. Standard errors in brackets. 
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Appendix 4. Low territorial presence sample (445 obs) 
Table 7: Summary statistics on the low territorial presence sample (N=445) 
 Mean Std dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max  
Economic involvement 0.82 0.23 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 
Innovation (units) 1.76 1.56 0 1 1 2 10 
Training 0.02 0.12 0 0 0 0 1 
Supply services 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0 2 
Existing outputs (units) 3 0,92 2 2 3 3 6 
Total sales (1,000 €) 278 235 17 123 209 359 1714 
Territorial presence 0.60 0.13 0.2 0.5 0.67 0.67 0.83 
Membership duration (years) 20 11 0 11 19 30 43 
Distance (100 km) 1.17 0.57 0.15 0.71 1.03 1.72 2.47 
County member density 0.18 0.14 0.00 0.09 0.14 0.26 0.71 
Farm specialization        
Mixed farming 0.89 0.31 0 1 1 1 1 
Specialization in crops 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1 
Specialization in animal 
production 
0.02 0.12 0 0 0 0 1 
Farm governance        
Sole owner 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 0 1 
Associates 0.79 0.41 0 1 1 1 1 
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Table 8. Estimation of the multinomial probit model on low territorial presence 
sample 
  Economic involvement (Ref : low) Med.  High 
  Innovation -0.181* -0.108 
    (0.111) (0.071) 
  Training 0.088 -0.288 
    (0.809) (0.787) 
  Supply services 2.071*** 1.900*** 
    (0.649) (0.605) 
  Existing outputs  0.980*** -0.347***  
    (0.195) (0.132) 
  Total Sales 3.032 2.542** 
   (2.032) (1.170) 
  Total Sales2 -1.988 -0.779 
   (1.875) (0.948) 
  Membership duration 0.006 0.046 
   (0.063) (0.038) 
  Membership duration2 -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.002) (0.001) 
  Distance  4.805* -0.380 
   (2.561) (0.929) 
  Distance2 -2.946** 0.418 
   (1.426) (0.362) 
  County member density 1.380 -0.201 
   (1.143) (0.773) 
  Farm specialization (Ref : Mix. farm)   
     Specialization in crops -11.871 1.928*** 
   (4.40E+8) (0.551) 
       Specialization in animal prod. -9.155 -0.810 
   (3.62E+8) (0.701)  
  Farm governance (Ref : Sole owner)   
    Associates 0.130 -0.746*** 
     (0.633) (0.280) 
  Const -6.231*** 1.272* 
    (1.535) (0.760) 
  Number of observations 445  
  Log likelihood -287.256  
  LR chi2 129.32  
*, **, *** significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%. Standard errors in brackets. 
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